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INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifteen years, courts and rule makers have increasingly
focused on the procedures surrounding the class certification hearing.1 This
increased focus has stemmed from a growing realization that the settlement
pressures that come from certification of a nationwide class action are so
strong that certification often effectively ends the litigation.2 Because
certification is so key to the outcome of the suit,3 certification hearings
have begun to look more and more like mini-trials, sometimes requiring the
submission of affidavits, competing expert testimony, and the introduction
of documents.4
As this evolution has occurred, questions have naturally begun to arise
about the extent to which the procedural rules governing normal trials
apply to these so-called mini-trials. In 2013, the Supreme Court in
Comcast Corporation v. Behrend granted certiorari over one such question:
Must a court resolve objections to the admissibility of expert testimony at
the certification hearing, when that evidence is used to show that Rule 23’s
requirements for certification are met?5
This procedure, commonly known as a Daubert ruling, requires the
judge to examine whether proffered expert testimony is sufficiently reliable
and probative as to be admissible, given a number of factors.6 The
Comcast Court, however, did not actually decide whether courts must make
Daubert rulings, because the Petitioners had failed to raise the issue below.7
It thus remains an open issue in class certification litigation. The issue is
an important one because expert witness testimony is routinely used to
show that class certification is proper.8
This Comment examines the Daubert issue through the lens of the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and
Comcast, and concludes that courts must now resolve Daubert objections at
the class certification stage. Part I of this comment gives a brief history of
the procedures surrounding class certification, discussing the Court’s
1. See infra Part III.a.
2. See infra Part III.a.
3. See infra Part III.a.
4. See Steven F. Grifith, Certification Hearings and Decisions, in A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 89, 90-91 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2010) (discussing the
necessity and procedure of an evidentiary hearing in deciding class certification); WILLIAM
B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 12 (5th ed. 2013) (stating that while district
courts have discretion as to whether to hold an evidentiary hearing in deciding class
certification, most courts chose to hold such a hearing).
5. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 n.4 (2013).
6. See infra Part II.a.
7. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 n.4 (2013).
8. Rubenstein, supra note 4, at 126-138.
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seemingly permissive approach in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin and the
clarification of its approach in General Telephone Company v. Falcon.
Part II examines the requirements of Daubert expert witness certification
and explains how pre-Wal-Mart and Comcast courts dealt with these
requirements at class certification. Part III examines the Court’s decisions
in Wal-Mart and Comcast and shows how these cases solidified a
heightened level of scrutiny for class certification. Part IV argues that
under Wal-Mart and Comcast, Courts must conclusively rule on Daubert at
class certification.
I.

EISEN AND FALCON: WHAT TO DO WITH OVERLAPPING MERITS
ISSUES.

In order to certify a class action, a district court must find that both the
elements of Rule 23(a)9 and all the requirements of one of the categories of
class actions in Rule 23(b) are met.10 The court often determines whether
these requirements have been met through a certification hearing where
testimony and evidence are presented.11 Before the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wal-Mart, courts disagreed about the extent to which they were
permitted to decide merits issues at these hearings when those issues
overlapped with the requirements for certification under Rule 23.12 This
disagreement stemmed from seemingly conflicting language in two
Supreme Court cases: Eisen and Falcon.13
In Eisen, the plaintiffs had filed a class action on behalf of odd-lot
traders on the New York Stock Exchange, alleging that defendant
brokerage firms had violated federal antitrust laws.14 Prior to certification,
the plaintiffs requested that defendants be made to share the costs of
notice.15 The district court conducted a hearing on the merits of plaintiffs’
antitrust claims, and after determining that the plaintiffs were likely to
prevail on the merits of those claims, ordered that costs of notice be shifted

9. The 23(a) requirements are that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
11. Rubenstein, supra note 4, at 12-22.
12. See infra Part II.b.
13. See infra pp. 4-7.
14. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 160 (1974).
15. Id. at 166-167.
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to the defendant.16
The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to shift costs,
reasoning that the language of Rule 23 precluded the shifting of costs of
notice.17 The Court also condemned the district court’s decision to
determine the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits, stating:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into
the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action . . . . In determining the propriety of a
class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs
have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but
rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.18
Citing this language, many courts after Eisen determined that they lacked
the authority to decide merits issues that overlapped with the requirements
for certification under Rule 23.19
This interpretation of Eisen was probably wrong.20 In explaining why
the lower court’s merits determination was incorrect, the Eisen Court stated
that “such a procedure contravenes the Rule by allowing a representative
plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the
requirements for it.”21 In other words, what upset the Court was not that
merits had been examined, but that the district court had used a
determination that plaintiffs were likely to win, by way of a merits
examination, to disregard the notice requirements of Rule 23.22
The Supreme Court sought to clarify the confusion caused by Eisen
when it decided Falcon eight years later. In Falcon, the district court had
certified a 23(b)(3) class under Title VII where the class representative
alleged race-based discrimination in promotion, but sought to represent a
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 168.
Id. at 175-77.
Id. at 177-178.
See David S. Evans, Class Certification, the Merits, and Expert Evidence, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) (examining lower courts use of this language to forbid merits
inquiries).
20. As discussed in Part III.b., infra, the court in Wal-Mart explicitly rejected this
interpretation of Eisen.
21. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78.
22. See id. at 178 (describing the district court’s approach as “directly contrary to the
command of subdivision (c)(1) that the court determine whether a suit denominated a class
action may be maintained as such as soon as practicable after the commencement of the
action.” (internal quotations ommited)). Further support for this interpretation is found from
the court’s remark that the district court’s examination of the merits was unfair to
defendants, not plaintiffs. Id. at 178-179.
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class of employees who were discriminated against in hiring.23 The district
court had found that Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions
predominate over individual questions was met, because discrimination
suits “are often by their very nature class suits, involving class-wide
wrongs,” and “[c]ommon questions of law or fact are typically present.”24
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, holding that courts may
only certify a class if, “after a rigorous analysis,” they are convinced that
the requirements of Rule 23 are actually met, not just presumably so.25 The
Court acknowledged that this might sometimes require a court to “probe
behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,”
because the class certification decision “generally involves considerations
that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s
cause of action.’”26 Thus for the Falcon Court, deciding merits issues when
they overlap with certification requirements was not just permissible, it was
required.
Despite this statement by Falcon, Eisen’s seemingly conflicting
language produced uncertainty in the lower courts as to the proper scope of
their inquiry.27 The Seventh Circuit, for example, read Falcon to mean that
courts must not only hear evidence from plaintiffs on overlapping issues,
but must also weigh competing evidence on those issues from the defense.28
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, held that while overlapping merits
issues could be considered, competing defense evidence was not to be
examined.29 Citing to Eisen, the Second Circuit reasoned that courts were
not permitted to “conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in
order to determine whether [the case] may be maintained as a class
action.”30 As discussed in Part II.b., infra, this confusion has been a
23. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1982).
24. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez,
431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977)).
25. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161.
26. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
469 (1978)).
27. Rubenstein, supra note 4, at 117-126; Evans, supra note 19, at 10.
28. West v. Prudential Sec., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
29. Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled
by In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
30. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 291. The Second Circuit later backed off this approach,
holding in In re IPO Sec. Litig. that a court must consider competing evidence. In re IPO
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 27. Other courts, while acknowledging that consideration of merits
issues was necessary, admonished against turning the class certification hearing into a minitrial on the merits. See Madison v. Chalmette Refining, LLC, 637 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir.
2011) (noting that class certifications should not be “mini-trials” on the merits, while also
acknowledging that overlapping merits issues must be considered); see also Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 581 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)
(“[Rigorous analysis] does not mean that a district court must conduct a full-blown trial on
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substantial contributor to the differing approaches of courts in dealing with
Daubert objections at the class certification stage.
II.

DAUBERT: ITS REQUIREMENTS AND HOW PRE-WAL-MART AND
COMCAST COURTS DEALT WITH THOSE REQUIREMENTS.

In the context of a trial, the Daubert test requires judges to examine
the reliability of expert testimony and to rule on its admissibility at the
outset.31 Before the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, there was disagreement
between the circuits on the scope of a judge’s Daubert inquiry at the class
certification stage.32 Some courts held that a full and conclusive Daubert
analysis was required, while other courts were less exacting, requiring
general scrutiny but not a conclusive ruling on admissibility.33 These
different approaches stemmed in part from disagreement about the scope of
the court’s class certification inquiry under Eisen and Falcon.34
A. The Daubert Test
The Daubert test is an application of Federal Rule of Evidence
(“FRE”) 702, which governs expert testimony at trial. Witnesses are
generally forbidden from testifying as to opinions, and non-expert
witnesses may only offer opinions when they are tied to the witness’s
actual observations or helpful in understanding first-hand observations.35
This restrictive approach reflects the pervasive philosophy of the common
law that first-hand observations are the most reliable source of
information.36 Expert witness testimony, which allows the expert to testify
in the form of an opinion despite a lack of personal observation,37 thus

the merits prior to certification.”).
31. See infra Part II.a.
32. See infra Part II.b.
33. See infra Part II.b.
34. See infra Part II.b.
35. See FED. R. EVID. 701(a)-(b) (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony
in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s
perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a
fact in issue.”).
36. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note to 1972 Proposed Rules (“The
rule retains the traditional objective of putting the trier of fact in possession of an accurate
reproduction of the event.”); id. (“[Testimony] rationally based on the witness’s
perception . . . is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.”);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (noting that first-hand
knowledge was deemed to be the most reliable source of information under the common
law).
37. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating the grounds on which an expert may testify);
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represents a departure from the FRE’s general approach to opinion
testimony.38
Because expert testimony is a departure from usual notions of
reliability, the Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. held
that in order to be admissible, expert testimony must “have a reliable basis
in the knowledge and experience of [the expert’s] discipline.”39 In the
context of testimony about scientific information, this meant that in order
to be reliable, the expert’s testimony needed to be “ground[ed] in the
methods and procedures of science” and derived from the scientific
method.40 The expert him or herself must have sufficient “knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.”41
The Court also imposed what might initially seem like an
unremarkable requirement: the expert evidence must be relevant, meaning
that it “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.”42 A requirement that evidence be relevant seems
unremarkable, because relevance is a prerequisite to the admission of any
evidence under the FRE.43 However, in the context of expert testimony,
relevance means it is not enough for the expert to present scientific
evidence and opine that such evidence is probative of a fact in issue.44
Instead, it must be shown that the expert’s “reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”45 Later courts elaborated that
not only must the methodology of the expert be reliable, but the
methodology’s application to the facts must also be reliable.46
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (“[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions,
including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.”).
38. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-592.
39. Id. at 592. Daubert itself dealt with scientific expert evidence, but the court later
extended its holding to all expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
40. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
41. FED. R. EVID. 702.
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).
43. FED. R. EVID. 402.
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may
provide valid scientific “knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness
is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not
assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have
behaved irrationally on that night.”).
45. Id. at 593.
46. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997). The test is flexible, giving
judges latitude to decide which factors are relevant in determining the reliability of
testimony in a particular case. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150
(1999). Decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony are reviewed on an abuse of
discretion standard. Gen. Elec., 522 U.S. 136.
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Daubert itself dealt with expert testimony linking ingestion of the
drug Bendectin to birth defects. Applying the newly announced Daubert
test on remand, the Ninth Circuit excluded expert testimony that purported
to show a causal link between ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy and
eventual birth defects.47 The experts in Daubert testified that Bendectin
could cause birth defects, because statistics showed that women who
ingested Bendectin had a higher incidence of birth defects.48 The court
held, however, that mere correlation was not sufficient to show but-for
causation, and thus was not relevant.49 In order to show causation, the
experts needed to show that Benedictin more than doubled the incidence of
birth defects in the general population or use statistical techniques to isolate
other potential causes.50 Therefore, even though the expert evidence
showed Bendectin increased the incidence of birth defects, it was not
probative of a fact in issue, and therefore not admissible.51
Under Daubert, the judge must determine at the outset whether the
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable, before the jury hears the
testimony.52 The test thus places the judge in a “gatekeeping” role.53 This
gatekeeping role is justified on the grounds that experts enjoy testimonial
privileges including the ability to offer opinions not tied to first-hand
knowledge.54 Juries may also be unduly swayed by expert testimony, as
they will view it as scientific, and thus infallible.55 Because Daubert is
about gatekeeping, many courts have held that it becomes less important in
bench trials, since there is no jury to protect.56 The Seventh Circuit in
47. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
53. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147.
55. Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s
Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1102 (2006); Robert J. Goodwin,
Fifty Years of Frye in Alabama: The Continuing Debate over Adopting the Test Established
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 247 (2005). The
Daubert gatekeeping role has been criticized on several grounds. Some argue that it
requires federal judges to become “amateur scientists,” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and question whether judges are actually better at determining
the reliability of technical evidence than juries; Frank R. Emmerich Jr., Note, The Supreme
Court Strengthens the Discretionary Powers of the District Courts in Admitting Expert
Scientific Testimony: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
1051, 1083 (1994).
56. See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“The main purpose of Daubert exclusion is to protect juries from being swayed by dubious
scientific testimony. That interest is not implicated . . . where the judge is the decision
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Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, for example, noted that “the usual
concerns of the rule—keeping unreliable expert testimony from the jury—
are not present in such a setting, and our review must take this factor into
consideration.”57
B. Daubert at the Certification Stage in the Pre-Wal-Mart Era
Given the weakening of Daubert when no jury is present, and given
their interpretation of Eisen as disallowing consideration of the merits at
the class certification stage, some pre-Wal-Mart courts decided that they
need not rule conclusively on Daubert objections when deciding whether to
certify a class, or concluded they need only conduct a limited Daubert
inquiry.58 Other courts, however, held that Daubert objections did need to
be decided, and some courts went even further, holding that competing
defense expert testimony must be considered.59
The group that subscribed to a limited Daubert inquiry believed that
while a court generally must verify the quality of expert testimony, it need
not, as a general rule, definitively decide Daubert objections.60 The Ninth
Circuit, for example, took the approach that “as a general rule, district
courts are not required to hold a Daubert hearing before ruling on the
admissibility of scientific evidence.”61 While a court may have needed to
examine certain elements of an expert’s testimony, particularly the
maker.”); Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 615 F.3d 321, 330
(5th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he importance of the trial court’s gatekeeper role is significantly
diminished in bench trials, as in this instance, because, there being no jury, there is no risk
of tainting the trial by exposing a jury to unreliable evidence”); Attorney Gen. of Oklahoma
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 779 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he usual concerns regarding
unreliable expert testimony reaching a jury obviously do not arise when a district court is
conducting a bench trial.”); United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“There is less need for the gatekeeper to keep the gate when the gatekeeper is keeping the
gate only for himself.”) (internal quotations omitted).
57. 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010). Commentators also question whether juries
actually do give undue weight to expert testimony. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2001).
58. See infra pp. 9-10
59. See infra p. 11. Though differences clearly existed between circuits on how
Daubert should be handled at the class certification stage, it might be too harsh to call these
differences a “split.” The circuits that did not require conclusive rulings on Daubert still
examined the methodology of the expert, and in some cases compared it to competing
expert testimony from the defense. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 60508 (9th Cir. 2010) (examining closely the plaintiff expert’s methodology); Blades v.
Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 569-71 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to rule definitively on
Daubert but also considering and weighing competing expert testimony from defense).
60. Rubenstein, supra note 4, §7:24.
61. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 573 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted).
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methodology, a court was generally not required to decide whether an
expert’s testimony was sufficiently probative.62 According to the Ninth
Circuit, the probative value of expert testimony was an issue for the
ultimate fact finder, and ruling on such unnecessarily involved the court in
merits determinations in violation of Eisen.63
The Eighth Circuit similarly believed that a full Daubert inquiry was
not necessary because certification “disputes may be resolved only insofar
as resolution is necessary to determine the nature of the evidence that
would be sufficient.”64 In Blades v. Monsanto Co., the Eight Circuit upheld
a district court’s decision not to definitively rule on a Daubert objection to
expert testimony.65
Although the district court did examine the
methodology of the expert, the court declined to conclusively rule on such
evidence, reasoning that it was “appropriate for [the court] . . . to consider
all evidence at this stage of the proceedings.”66 This language in Monsanto
could be taken as an acknowledgement of the reduced importance of the
gatekeeper role of a court at the class certification hearing given that the
judge, and not the jury, decides class certification motions. In other words,
the court decided it was proper to hear “all evidence” because at the class
certification hearing, there was no jury to protect. This language could also
be taken to mean that a definitive ruling on evidence exclusion was
improper at class certification because class certification is preliminary,
and courts should not be making definitive rules if they will overlap with
the merits.67
In contrast to the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit held
in American Honda Motor Company v. Allen that when expert testimony is
critical to class certification, a district court is required to conduct a full
Daubert analysis and conclusively rule on admissibility.68 The district
court in American Honda had done a partial Daubert analysis, examining
the witness’s methodology closely, but refusing to exclude the expert
testimony “at this early stage of the proceedings,” despite doubts about its
reliability.69 Thus, like the court in Monsanto, the district court viewed the
certification stage as preliminary, or perhaps possessed an Eisen-like
62. Id. at 602-03
63. Id.
64. Blades, 400 F.3d at 567. The Second Circuit was also in the limited Daubert group
until the overruling of Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir.
1999) by In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
65. Blades, 400 F.3d at 567.
66. Id. at 569.
67. As discussed in Part III.b., infra, the Eight Circuit confirmed post-Wal-Mart that
both these considerations were in play.
68. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010)
69. Allen v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 264 F.R.D. 412, 428 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
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hesitancy towards merits determinations.70
The Seventh Circuit reversed, saying that “a district court must make
the necessary factual and legal inquiries and decide all relevant contested
issues prior to certification” and may not take a “provisional approach.”71
Thus, unlike the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit did not
view the combination of Eisen and Falcon as mandating a tentative
approach to overlapping merits issues. Instead, a “rigorous analysis” meant
that courts must actually decide overlapping merits issues.72 Since these
overlapping issues were to be actually decided,73 the court should use its
normal tools of procedural protections, including Daubert, to ensure that
only reliable evidence was used.74
III.

WAL-MART AND COMCAST: AFFIRMING FALCON AND ITS
RIGOROUS ANALYSIS

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, lower courts and rule makers began
to address concerns about the ability of the structural pressures of class
certification to compel settlement.75 Then in 2011 and 2013, respectively,
the Court decided Wal-Mart and Comcast, which came firmly down on the
side of Falcon, explicitly stating that Eisen had been misinterpreted.76 The
combination of these developments has greatly changed the landscape of
70. See Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 600 F.3d at 817 (“The district court’s actions here
were more akin to the provisional approach that we rejected in Szabo.”) (internal quotation
omitted).
71. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 600 F.3d at 817.
72. See id. at 817 (“A district judge may not duck hard questions by observing that
each side has some support . . . . Tough questions must be faced and squarely decided.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
73. The fact that the court decided an overlapping merits issue does not mean a later
fact finder is bound by the court’s determination of that issue at the certification stage. In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (2009).
74. See Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 600 F.3d at 817 (“Ezra’s testimony is necessary to
show that Plaintiffs’ claims are capable of resolution on a class-wide basis and that the
common defect in the motorcycle predominates over the class members’ individual issues.
Therefore, by failing to clearly resolve the issue of its admissibility before certifying the
class, the district court erred.”). The Third Circuit was a notable exception to this
generalization in that it dictated a searching review at class certification, but did not require
a full Daubert analysis. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011)
(applying the Third Circuit standard that the certification requirements be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, but not requiring a final ruling on a Daubert objection). It
might be the case, however, that Behrend was incorrectly decided under the Third Circuit’s
decision in Hydrogen Peroxide. See Behrend, 655 F.3d at 214-15 (Jordan, J., dissenting)
(“[The Expert’s] testimony is irrelevant and should be inadmissible at trial, pursuant to . . .
Daubert . . . . Thus, it cannot constitute common evidence of damages.”)
75. See infra Part III.a.
76. See infra Part III.b.
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class certification.
A. Pre-Wal-Mart and Comcast Developments
In the decade preceding the Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and
Comcast, courts and rule makers increased the procedural protections
surrounding class certification. These increases stemmed in part from
concerns about the ability of certification to force defendants to settle.77 As
noted by the Third Circuit in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation,
class certification was generally the whole ball game in class actions,78
because certification “may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the
costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous
liability.”79
These concerns led the Federal Rules Committee to amend Rule 23(f)
in 1998 to allow for permissive interlocutory appeal of class certification
decisions. Prior to this amendment, a party seeking to appeal a certification
decision could generally only do so after going to trial and losing.80 Given
the danger and cost of going to trial, this rarely happened.81 Thus the
district court’s certification decision, though truly pivotal, was effectively
unappealable.82
Interlocutory appeal of certification decisions was
designed to remedy this harsh outcome.83
The rules committee also amended Rule 23(c)(1)(A) in 2003, which
dealt with the timing of the certification decision. The language of the rule
was changed from requiring certification “as soon as practicable” to “at an
early practicable time.”84 This change was made, according to the rules
77. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008)
(expressing concerns about the settlement pressures caused by certification); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (“Judge Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole,
called settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action
‘blackmail settlements.’” (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 120 (1973)).
78. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (“[D]enying or granting class
certification is often the defining moment in class actions.”) The Hydrogen Peroxide court
also acknowledged, albeit with less discussion, that class certification was the whole ball
game for plaintiffs, saying denial generally sounded the “death knell” for plaintiffs. Id.
Though not stated, the court in Hydrogen Peroxide was likely referring to so called
“negative value suits,” where the cost of bringing an individual claim outweighs any
possible recovery from that claim.
79. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note, 1998 Amendments).
80. Rubenstein, supra note 4, §7:41.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note, 2003 Amendments.
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committee, in order to allow for more time to gather information relevant to
the certification decision through discovery.85 In the same package of
amendments, Rule 23(c)(1)(C) was amended to remove language asserting
that class certification was conditional.86 Looked at together, these
amendments give rise to a clear implication: certification is not a tentative
preliminary ruling based on limited facts—it is a critical outcome
determinative decision that requires close scrutiny.87
Around the time of these amendments, courts began to clarify or raise
the standard for certification in acknowledgement of the concerns about
settlement pressure, and perhaps belatedly in recognition of the fallacy of a
conflict between Eisen and Falcon. In 2006, the Second Circuit, which had
been one of the more merits-adverse circuits, reversed course in IPO
Securities Litigation, holding that it was no longer enough for a court to
certify a class on “some showing” that Rule 23’s requirements are met.88
Instead, the court must make a “ruling” or “determination” that the
requirements of Rule 23 are met by a “preponderance of the evidence.”89
In 2008, the Third Circuit similarly held in Hydrogen Peroxide that factual
determinations necessary for determination of Rule 23, even those that
overlapped with the merits, must be shown by a “preponderance of the
evidence.”90 This meant that a court “must find that the evidence more
likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of
Rule 23.”91
85. See id. (“Time may be needed to gather information necessary to make the
certification decision.”)
86. Id. Prior to this amendment, courts had been certifying classes on the condition
that Rule 23’s provisions be met at some point before trial. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552
F.3d at 319-20. This amendment eliminated this possibility, requiring courts to ensure the
requirements of Rule 23 were met before certification. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory
committee’s note, 2003 Amendments (“A court that is not satisfied that the requirements of
Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.”).
87. See In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 39 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that that the 2003
amendments “arguably combine to permit a more extensive inquiry into whether Rule 23
requirements are met than was previously appropriate”); In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d
at 320 (“While these amendments do not alter the substantive standards for class
certification, they guide the trial court in its proper task-to consider carefully all relevant
evidence and make a definitive determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been
met before certifying a class.”).
88. In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 40.
89. Id. at 37, 40. Although IPO mentioned the preponderance of the evidence
standard, it was not clear that the court had adopted this standard until the court in
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension. Fund v. Bombardier Inc. confirmed that it had.
546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit analogized to a ruling on jurisdiction,
which would require the court to make rulings on factual and legal issues. In re IPO Sec.
Litig., 471 F.3d at 40.
90. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320.
91. Id.
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B. Wal-Mart
In Wal-Mart, the Court considered the certification of a nationwide
23(b)(2) injunctive class composed of female Wal-Mart employees that
alleged sex-based discrimination in pay and promotion in violation of Title
VII.92 Plaintiffs alleged that while Wal-Mart’s official employment
policies forbid discrimination, its decentralized system of decisionmaking,
where local managers made decisions on promotion and pay, had the effect
of discriminating against women.93 Plaintiffs also alleged that Wal-Mart
had a strong corporate culture that permitted bias against women and that
this culture infected the decisions of local managers.94
In order to prove their allegations, plaintiffs presented expert
testimony from a sociology professor.95 The expert used a social
framework analysis to show that Wal-Mart had a strong corporate culture
that made it vulnerable to gender bias.96 The defendants had disputed in the
district court whether the expert’s testimony was admissible under Daubert
standards, but the district court had declined to rule conclusively on this
issue, thinking such a ruling unnecessary at the class certification stage.97
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s certification of the
class, holding that the requirement of commonality under 23(a) had not
been met.98 The Court noted that there was significant overlap in this case
between 23(a) commonality and Title VII’s pattern or practice
discrimination.99 The fact that the court would thus have to decide a merits
issue in order to determine a certification issue gave the Court no pause.
Citing Falcon, the Court asserted that a court must engage in a “rigorous
analysis” when deciding if Rule 23’s requirements are met.100 This is so
even if merits issues overlap.101 Such overlap “cannot be helped.”102 In a
footnote, the Court expressly rejected the idea that Eisen forbid merits
inquiries, saying that Eisen merely rejected looking at the merits in order to
circumvent Rule 23’s notice requirements.103 The Court did not set forth a
standard of proof for determining if Rule 23’s requirements were met, such
92.
93.
94.
95.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
Id. at 2548.
Id.
Id. at 2553; Faculty Profile of William Bielby, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
CHICAGO, http://soc.uic.edu/sociology/people/faculty/wbielby (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
96. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2556-57.
99. Id. at 2552.
100. Id. at 2551.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2552 n.6.
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as the “preponderance of the evidence” proposed by the Second and Third
Circuits. The Court did note, however, that Rule 23’s requirements must
be met “in fact,”104 and that plaintiffs “must affirmatively demonstrate
[their] compliance”105 with “significant proof.”106
Regarding the lower court’s assertion that the Daubert inquiry was not
required at the certification stage, the Court said in dictum, “[w]e doubt
that is so,” but did not actually decide the issue.107 The Court then went on
to examine closely the probative value of the expert’s testimony, ultimately
finding that the testimony failed to prove a practice or procedure of
discrimination for purposes of Title VII and for commonality under Rule
23(a).108 The problem for the Court was that the expert’s theory asserted
that corporate culture caused discrimination through stereotyped thinking,
but the expert could not determine what percentage of pay and promotion
decisions were actually caused by such thinking.109 The testimony thus was
not probative of a fact at issue.110
C. Comcast
In Comcast, decided two years after Wal-Mart, the district court had
certified a 23(b)(3) consumer class action against Comcast, a cable
television provider.111 Plaintiffs alleged that Comcast had violated federal
antitrust laws by attempting to monopolize the Philadelphia television
market.112 In order to meet their burden under 23(b)(3) to establish that
common questions predominated over individual ones, the plaintiffs sought
to show that damages were capable of common proof through the expert
testimony of an economist.113 The defendants had challenged the
104. Id. at 2551 (emphasis in original).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2553 (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982)). The
court also cited Falcon for the proposition that actual, not presumed, compliance with Rule
23 is required. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161).
107. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2254.
110. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2254 (stating that the expert testimony “d[id] nothing to
advance respondents’ case.”).
111. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1429-30 (2013).
112. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430.
113. Id. As the dissent in Comcast points out, it is highly questionable that the plaintiff
actually needed to show commonality of damages. See id. at 1437 (Ginsberg, J., & Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“Recognition that individual damages calculations do not preclude class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”). The Court noted, however, that
respondent plaintiffs had not challenged that assertion at the certiorari stage. See id. at 1430
(“The District Court held, and it is uncontested here, that to meet the predominance
requirement respondents had to show . . . that the damages resulting from [the] injury were
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methodology of this expert, both directly and through competing expert
testimony. The Third Circuit, however, citing to Eisen, ruled that such
challenges were “attacks on the merits of the methodology that have no
place in the class certification inquiry.”114
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether a court
must rule on Daubert objections.115 The Court declined to decide the
Daubert issue, however, because defendants had not properly raised it
below.116 Nonetheless, as in Wal-Mart, the Court decided it had the duty to
scrutinize the expert’s testimony, because the failure to object to Daubert
admissibility does not preclude examination of whether Rule 23’s
requirements were met by that testimony.117
In reversing, the Court held that the Third Circuit’s treatment of the
defense’s attacks on the methodology of the expert directly contradicted the
Court’s statement in Wal-Mart that courts must conduct a rigorous analysis,
even if it entailed overlapping merits issues.118 The Court rejected the
Third Circuit’s assertion that it need not determine whether the
methodology of the expert was a “just and reasonable inference or
speculative,” reasoning that under such a rule, “any method of
measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied class-wide, no
matter how arbitrary the measurements may be.”119 In other words, just
because an expert’s model says it shows class-wide damages, does not
mean Rule 23 has been satisfied. Instead, the model must actually show
class-wide damages based on a reliable methodology.120
measurable ‘on a class-wide basis’ through use of a ‘common methodology.’” (quoting
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 154 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
114. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426
(2013). The Third Circuit reasoned that defendants’ challenges were merits inquiries
because the challenges would only change the amount of damages, not the district court’s
holding that damages were capable of proof on a common basis. Behrend, 655 F.3d at 207.
115. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431 n.4 (“Whether a district court may certify a class
action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence,
including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a
class-wide basis.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1432 n.4 (“Such a forfeit would make it impossible for petitioners to argue
that Dr. McClave’s testimony was not ‘admissible evidence’ under the Rules; but it does not
make it impossible for them to argue that the evidence failed to show that the case is
susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.”) (internal quotations omitted).
118. Id. at 1432-33.
119. Id. at 1433 (quoting Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206).
120. See id. (“[I]t is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification,
respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement
on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance”). The Court’s reasoning seems to reflect concerns by other
commentators, that uncritical acceptance of expert reports at the certification stage “han[ds]
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The Court then went on to reject the probative value of the expert’s
report. The expert had used a statistical regression model to show what
prices would have been but-for Comcast’s anticompetitive behavior.121 The
difference between this model’s calculations and actual prices was
purported to be the damages from the anticompetitive behavior.122 The
problem with this model, according to the Court, was that the plaintiffs had
originally alleged four theories of antitrust impact from which damages
could flow, but the court below rejected all but one.123 The expert’s model
failed to isolate damages from the one remaining theory.124 Thus, it could
not be shown that the damages alleged were actually from the one
remaining theory, and not another rejected theory.125 Therefore, because
the expert’s model failed to show that damages were capable of proof on a
class-wide basis, the class was improperly certified.126
D. How Daubert has been Handled by Courts Post-Wal-Mart and
Comcast
After Wal-Mart and Comcast, courts continued to diverge on the issue
of Daubert at class certification. The Eighth Circuit in In re Zurn Pex
Plumbing Products Liability Litigation affirmed its pre-Wal-Mart stance
that a full and conclusive Daubert ruling was not necessary at the class
certification stage.127 It reasoned that certification is inherently tentative
and that the judge’s Daubert gatekeeper role is not as important at class
certification where there is no jury.128 The Seventh Circuit, however, in
Messner v. Northshore University Health System concluded that the district
court must make a conclusive ruling on any challenges to an expert’s
testimony.129

off to experts” the “decision as to whether the elements are susceptible to common proof.”
Kermit Roosevelt III, Defeating Class Certification in Securities Fraud Actions, 22 REV.
LITIG. 405, 425 (2003). This quote was used by the Comcast petitioners in their brief to the
court. Brief for Petitioners at 41, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426.
121. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1434, citing Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 216 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Jordan, J. dissenting).
126. Id. at 1433.
127. In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 614 (8th Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at 613.
129. Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012).
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THE IMPACT OF WAL-MART AND COMCAST

Although courts have continued to diverge somewhat on the issue of
Daubert at class certification, the Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and
Comcast probably settle the issue in favor of those circuits requiring a full
and conclusive Daubert ruling. These decisions, in conjunction with
developments before those decisions were handed down, have undermined
many of the arguments advanced against a conclusive Daubert ruling and
leave little room for the limited Daubert analysis that some courts have
engaged in.
A. The Falcon Supremacy
After Wal-Mart and Comcast, there is no doubt that courts must
consider merits issues that overlap with the requirements for certification.
Citing to Falcon, Wal-Mart explicitly rejected the interpretation of Eisen
that said courts cannot look at merits issues, saying that Eisen was about
not circumventing Rule 23’s requirements via a merits examination.130
Comcast affirmed this understanding.131 Wal-Mart also did not suggest that
courts must walk on eggshells when considering overlapping merits issues.
Instead, it remarked that such overlap “[could not] be helped” and that a
court’s consideration of certification requirements must nonetheless be
“rigorous.”132
This interpretation of Eisen eliminates one of the major objections to
Daubert at class certification. As mentioned in Part III.b., supra, confusion
about Eisen’s meaning was a major source of disagreement about whether
Daubert objections had to be decided. Courts that rejected the idea that a
conclusive and full Daubert analysis must be made often cited to Eisen’s
prohibition against merits inquiries.133 These courts reasoned that to rule
on Daubert was to rule on merits issues like the probative value of the
expert’s testimony.134 With the mistaken Eisen interpretation out of the
way, this concern should no longer apply.
Comcast’s treatment of expert testimony demonstrates this result. In
130. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
131. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432-33 (“By refusing to entertain arguments against
respondents’ damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification, simply because
those arguments would also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals
ran afoul of our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry.”).
132. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
133. See supra Part III.b (discussing the overlap between Rule 23 commonality and the
merits of a case for certifying plaintiff classes).
134. See supra Part II.b (discussing the need to rule on Daubert objections at the
certification stage).
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Comcast, the Court closely scrutinized the methodology of the expert’s
statistical model in a Daubert-like manner, asking not only whether it
purported to prove damages on a common basis, but also whether it
actually did so through good inferences and assumptions.135 The Third
Circuit had considered such an inquiry an improper consideration of the
merits.136 The Court explicitly rejected this argument, saying courts were
required to test the methodology of experts, even without a Daubert
objection to such testimony.137
The Court’s recent opinion in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans & Trust Funds does not affect this reasoning. In Amgen, the Court
upheld the certification of a 23(b)(3) securities class action where plaintiffs
sought to meet 23(b)(3)’s requirement of predominance through a fraud-onmarket presumption, but had not yet shown materiality.138 The Court held,
however, that materiality did not need to be proven at the class certification
stage because determination of materiality was capable of resolution on a
class-wide basis.139 The Court also noted that merits issues may be
“considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to
determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are
satisfied.”140 This language does not reverse Wal-Mart’s rejection of the
erroneous Eisen interpretation, and instead clarifies that 23(b)(3)
predominance can be met if an element of the cause of action will either
succeed or fail on a class-wide basis, even if that key issue is a prerequisite
to making other issues provable on a class-wide basis.141
B. Tentative No More
Pre-Wal-Mart developments, as well as Wal-Mart itself and Comcast,
have significantly reduced the extent to which a class certification is
considered tentative, and thus have eliminated another major objection to
135. Supra Part III.c.
136. Supra Part III.c.
137. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 n.4. (2013).
138. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1190-91 (2013).
Materiality is a prerequisite to the fraud-on-the-market presumption, but it is not a
prerequisite to class certification. Id. at 1202.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 1196 (“[T]he failure of proof on the element of materiality would end the
case for one and for all; no claim would remain in which individual reliance issues could
potentially predominate.”) See Oral Argument at 15:15-25, Haliburton Co, v. Erica P. John
Fund, Inc., __S. Ct. ___ (2014) (Kagan, J.) (“[Amgen] said . . . when you rule on a question
like materiality, which leaves all members of the class in the exact same position, either
with a viable claim or with no claim, and it doesn’t split the class in the way that the
efficient markets theory do, that’s the difference.”)
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full Daubert at certification. The idea that class certification is tentative,
and thus that a conclusive ruling on Daubert is inappropriate, comes from a
footnote in the Court’s opinion in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, where
the Court said that certification is “inherently tentative.”142 The issue in
Coopers was whether a class certification decision was a “final decision,”
and thus appealable as of right.143 In holding it was not, the court cited to
the version of Rule 23(c)(1) in existence at the time, which said that
certification orders could be modified prior to trial.144
Much has changed since Coopers. As mentioned in Part III.a., supra,
serious concerns about the settlement pressures that flow from a certified
class led rule makers to enact changes to Rule 23. First, interlocutory
appeal, whose unavailability made the Court’s holding in Coopers
necessary, is now available via Rule 23(f). Second, the rule cited to by
Coopers for the proposition that certification is tentative, Rule 23(c)(1), has
been changed such that conditional certification is no longer available.145
Third, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was amended to allow for more flexibility in the
timing of the class certification, with the idea being that certification was
an important decision that needed to be made with sufficient information.146
Wal-Mart and Comcast also undermine notions of tentativeness. Both
these cases engage in lengthy discussion about the scope of a court’s
review in certifying a class and scrutinize expert witness testimony used in
certification.147 The word “tentative,” however, appears nowhere in either
case.148 The Court also uses strong language in those cases inconsistent
with a tentative approach. To say that something is tentative is to say it is
“uncertain” or “not fully worked out.”149 This understanding is hard to
reconcile with Wal-Mart’s statement that plaintiffs must “affirmatively
demonstrate . . . compliance with the Rule,” showing they are “in fact”
satisfied.150
142. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978).
143. Id. at 464-65.
144. Id. at 465.
145. See supra Part III.a. Although the Coopers court did not cite this portion of
23(c)(1), the elimination of conditional certification nonetheless weakens this provision
generally as support for the tentative nature of certification by requiring that certification,
and thus the provisions of Rule 23, be conclusively decided.
146. See supra Part III.a.
147. See supra Part Part III.b-c.
148. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
149. Tentative Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/tentative (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
150. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis in original). The court also quoted Falcon,
writing that “[a]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains . . .
indispensable.” Id. (citing General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)).
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The non-tentative nature of certification also undermines the argument
that Daubert at certification is improper, because merits discovery has not
yet been completed at certification. The court in In re Zurn put forward
this argument, reasoning that certification happens at a time when full
merits discovery has not been completed, but Daubert analysis is often
incomplete without the information that full merits discovery provides.151
A Daubert ruling would thus be premature.152
As noted above, however, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was expressly amended so
as to allow more information gathering before the certification hearing.153
The committee notes also point out that it is very difficult to distinguish
between merits and certification discovery in the first place.154 Thus, in
light of these amendments and the non-tentative nature of certification
generally, the solution in In re Zurn should not have been to relax the
Daubert analysis, but to fulfill the purpose of the 23(c)(1)(A) amendment
by allowing for full merits discovery.
The fact that certification is less tentative also strengthens the case for
full Daubert inquiry by way of analogy to summary judgment. When
considering a summary judgment motion, which finally decides issues in
the case, a court may only consider admissible evidence.155 Parties arguing
for full Daubert inquiry have thus argued that because the certification
decision effectually decides issues, that decision must also be made on only
admissible evidence; i.e., Daubert-worthy evidence.156 Objectors have
countered, however, that summary judgment is inapposite, because unlike
summary judgment, class certification is tentative.157 Thus, if certification
is not really tentative, then the analogy to summary judgment is a much
more persuasive one.
C. Standard of Conduct: Rigorous Analysis
The idea that courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” provides
support for the idea that courts must conclusively decide Daubert

151. See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liability, 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that “[defendant]’s desire for an exhaustive and conclusive Daubert inquiry before
the completion of merits discovery cannot be reconciled with the inherently preliminary
nature of pretrial evidentiary and class certification rulings”). For example, in In re Zurn,
the court had bifurcated discovery between discovery necessary for merits determinations
and discovery necessary for certification. Id. at 609.
152. Id. at 613.
153. See supra Part III.a.
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note, 2003 Amendments.
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
156. In re Zurn, 644 F.3d at 613.
157. Id.
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objections, when viewed in context of the strong language in Wal-Mart and
Comcast and that language’s application in those cases. Wal-Mart and
Comcast both emphasized Falcon’s requirement that courts conduct a
“rigorous analysis,” including a rigorous analysis of expert testimony. 158
Comcast also espoused the similar requirement of a “close look.”159 These
requirements are not standards of decision as was Hydrogen Peroxide’s
requirement that issues be proven “by a preponderance of the evidence.”160
Instead, they are standards of conduct, telling the court to take more than a
passing look at the certification requirements. Because they are standards
of conduct, the issue for purposes of Daubert objections is whether a court
must conclusively rule on Daubert objections in order for its analysis to be
sufficiently rigorous.
Language in Wal-Mart and Comcast provides support for the idea that
a rigorous analysis must include a conclusive Daubert ruling. As
mentioned in Part IV.b., supra, Wal-Mart and Comcast remarked that the
requirements of Rule 23 must be met “in fact” through an affirmative
demonstration by the plaintiff. Wal-Mart also remarked that the plaintiff
needed to put on “significant proof,”161 and Comcast went a step further,
requiring “evidentiary proof.”162 These statements can be combined into
the following rule: A party must show that the requirements of Rules 23 are
met, in fact, through significant evidentiary proof. Given that under this
rule a party must use “significant evidentiary proof,” it is hard to see how a
court’s approach was “rigorous,” if it considered information that was not
sufficiently reliable to be admissible evidence. As Judge Jordan noted in
his partial dissent in Comcast below, “[a] court should be hard pressed to
conclude that the elements of a claim are capable of proof through evidence
common to a class if the only evidence proffered would not be admissible
as proof of anything.”163
The Court’s application of a “rigorous analysis” in Wal-Mart and
Comcast to expert testimony outside of Daubert also supports the case for a
conclusive Daubert ruling. In Wal-Mart, the Court discounted significantly
the probative value of the expert sociologist’s testimony, because his theory
of a pervasive corporate culture could not help determine how individual
employment decisions were made.164 In Comcast, the Court waded deep
into the details of the methodology behind the expert’s statistical model and
158. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
159. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
160. Rubenstein, supra note 4, §7:21.
161. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
162. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
163. Behrend v. Comcast, 655 F.3d 182, 215 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
164. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
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held that the model failed to show what it purported to show.165 The Court
waded so deep that the dissent accused the majority of second-guessing the
district court’s factual findings.166
These actions by the Courts in Wal-Mart and Comcast, while
technically done outside of Daubert, look very much like Daubert
inquiries. Comcast’s scrutiny of the plaintiff’s expert testimony, for
example, closely resembles the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the plaintiff’s
expert testimony on remand in Daubert itself. There, as in Comcast, the
Court rejected expert testimony on the grounds that even though the
expert’s statistics were properly calculated, those statistics were not
probative of a fact in issue because they had failed to isolate other potential
causes.167 Similarly in Wal-Mart, the Court did not criticize the expert’s
use of social framework analysis generally, but held that it lacked probative
value without the ability to isolate other reasons for an employment
decision.168 The fact that the Court would engage in these Daubert-like
analyses as part of its rigorous analysis, even though Daubert was not
challenged, suggests that the full Daubert inquiry is required for a
certification decision to be sufficiently rigorous.
D. Twiqbal
The procedural philosophy of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, known collectively as Twiqbal, also supports the
argument for full Daubert at certification. In Twombly, plaintiffs alleged
violations of federal antitrust laws by regional telephone companies.169 The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), saying that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts
that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”170 This formulation
of the pleading standard overruled the lower standard of Conley v.
165. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433-35.
166. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1440 (“[T]he District Court found McClave’s
econometric model capable of measuring damages on a classwide basis, even after striking
three of the injury theories. Contrary to the Court’s characterization, this was not a legal
conclusion about what the model proved; it was a factual finding about how the model
worked. Under our typical practice, we should leave that finding alone.”) (internal citations
omitted).
167. See supra Part I.a.
168. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (“Bielby’s testimony does nothing to advance
respondents’ case. [W]hether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the employment decisions at Wal–
Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking is the essential question on which
respondents’ theory of commonality depends. If Bielby admittedly has no answer to that
question, we can safely disregard what he has to say.”) (internal citations omitted).
169. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549-50 (2007).
170. Id. at 555.
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Gibson.171 The Court reasoned that discovery in a class action antitrust
case would be expensive, and thus “a district court must . . . insist upon
some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual
controversy to proceed.”172 The Court was unpersuaded by other methods
of weeding out unmeritorious cases such as judicial case management and
summary judgment, because “the threat of discovery expense will push
cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings.”173 The Court took a similar approach in Iqbal, where the
Court again raised the pleading standard where proceeding with the
litigation would have been burdensome.174
These concerns about non-meritorious claims in Twiqbal are similar to
those in class actions. As mentioned in Part III.a., supra, concerns about
the structural pressures created by class certification were a concern to
courts and rule makers. Regardless of the strength of the claims in a class
action, the act of certification “may force a defendant to settle rather than
incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially
ruinous liability.”175 Thus, because the structural concerns of class
certification are similar to those of Twiqbal, it stands to reason that the
Court would seek a solution similar to that found in Twiqbal.
Daubert is a solution similar in approach to Twiqbal’s heightened
pleading standards. Twiqbal distrusts the ability of judges to weed out bad
cases through judicial management. Instead, it prefers a formal legal rule
of exclusion: plaintiffs must plead more specifically, and if they do not,
courts must exclude those claims. Similarly, Daubert distrusts the ability
of judges to informally consider evidence, and proposes a formal legal rule
of exclusion: expert testimony must be sufficiently reliable, and if it is not,
courts must exclude that testimony.176 The Twiqbal philosophy also
counters arguments that the full Daubert inquiry is not necessary, because

171. Conley had only required that plaintiff’s pleading “give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957).
172. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)).
173. Id. at 559.
174. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009) (stating that a claim must be “plausible
on its face”). In Iqbal, proceeding would have required investigation into the propriety of
actions by the Attorney General during a time of war. See id. at 662 (detailing allegations of
discrimination by then Attorney General John Ashcroft).
175. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, 1998 Amendments).
176. Admittedly, the analogy to Twiqbal is weakened by the fact that the remedy for an
insufficient pleading is often amendment, and not dismissal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2)
(stating that leave to amend should be freely given).
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there is no jury to protect at class certification.177 The Court in Twiqbal
rejected the idea that judges did not need exclusionary pleading rules
because they could manage cases; the Court did not believe judges could be
their own gatekeepers.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s jurisprudence on class certification will likely continue to
evolve. Many important issues remain to be decided, including, most
notably, by what level of proof a plaintiff must show Rule 23’s
requirements are met.178 It is not perfectly clear which way the Court will
come out on this and other issues, but given the Court’s decisions in WalMart and Comcast, it is reasonably certain that a full and conclusive
Daubert analysis is now required at the class certification hearing.

177. See supra Part III.d.
178. Rubenstein, supra note 4, § 7:21.
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